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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its revision in 1988, the federal mail fraud statute1 and its 
accompanying “honest services” provision2 have been used together 
to prosecute corrupt public officials and private employees.3 By 
December 31, 1990, barely two years after § 1346 was passed, 1,561 
state and local officials awaited trial on corruption charges, many of 
which included mail fraud charges.4 The statute was used to convict a 
local housing official who failed to disclose a conflict of interest5 and 
to convict students who conspired with their professors to submit 
plagiarized work.6 It is currently being used to prosecute a former 
Alaska state legislator who concealed his dealings with an oil 
company while lobbying his colleagues in the legislature to pass 
legislation favorable to the oil company.7 
The circuit courts are divided on how to interpret § 1346, the 
*2011 J.D./LL.M Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2006). The history of the federal mail fraud statute traces 
back to 1872, when it was passed in an effort to prevent the use of the Post Office (now the 
Postal Service) to further fraudulent schemes. For a brief overview of the statute and its history, 
see Michael K. Avery, Whose Rights? Why States Should Set the Parameters for Federal Honest 
Services Mail and Wire Fraud Prosecutions, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1431, 1434–35 (2008). 
 2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to 
defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services.”) 
 3. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting), denying cert. 
to United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 4. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to 
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 154 (1994). 
 5. United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 6. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 369 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 7. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1248 (9th Cir. 2008), cert granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2863 (2009). 
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honest services provision.8 In a recent dissent to the Court’s denial of 
certiorari to a Seventh Circuit case9 interpreting the section, Justice 
Scalia expressed frustration that courts have not developed “some 
coherent limiting principle to define what ‘the intangible right of 
honest services’ is, whence it derives, and how it is violated.”10 The 
dissent went on to caution that “this expansive phrase invites abuse 
by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state 
legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of 
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct.”11 
Justice Scalia’s concerns may be addressed during the current 
term of the Supreme Court. The Court, in granting review to 
Weyhrauch v. United States12 from the Ninth Circuit, will decide 
whether, to convict a state official of honest services mail fraud, the 
government must prove that the defendant violated a disclosure duty 
imposed by state law.13 
The Petitioner, Bruce Weyhrauch, argues that such a state law 
violation is required, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that “the 
vague language of § 1346 is a mandate to create a federal common 
law of disclosure obligations of state officials.”14 The United States, as 
Respondent, contends that the “federal crime of honest-services mail 
fraud” should not be encumbered by a “state-law limiting principle.”15 
Though most federal crimes operate independently of state law, it 
may be that the only way to limit the federal crime of honest-services 
mail fraud is to require an independent state law violation. Such a 
limitation would address compelling federalist concerns identified by 
Weyhrauch and the Ninth Circuit.  Thus, it is likely the Supreme Court 
will not affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in its entirety, but will seek to 
limit the scope of § 1346. 
 8. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1243. 
 9. United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 10. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Weyhrauch v United States, 548 F.3d 1237, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (2009). 
 13. Weyhrauch v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (U.S. 2009). The Court will also address 
honest-services fraud in the private context in United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, cert. granted, 
129 S. Ct. 2379 (2009). The Court in Black will have the opportunity to resolve a circuit split by 
deciding the scope of § 1346 with regard to private actors, since § 1346 ostensibly applies to any 
person. This case will not be discussed in this commentary. 
 14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Weyhrauch v. United States, No. 08-1196 (U.S. Mar. 
25, 2009). 
 15. Brief of Respondent at 6, Weyhrauch, No. 08-1196 (U.S. May 27, 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
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II. FACTS 
Attorney Bruce Weyhrauch was an elected member of the Alaska 
House of Representatives from 2002 to 2007.16 In 2006, VECO Corp, 
an oil services company, was lobbying the House of Representatives 
in opposition to increased oil taxes.17 On May 4, 2006, Weyhrauch 
mailed a resume and cover letter to VECO’s CEO in which he 
offered to provide legal services and representation to the company.18 
In hope of securing future employment, Weyhrauch voted in ways 
favorable to VECO, lobbied other elected officials to vote similarly, 
and supported additional legislation favorable to VECO.19 
Weyhrauch was indicted for “devising ‘a scheme and artifice to 
defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] 
honest services . . . performed free from deceit, self-dealing, bias, and 
concealment’ and attempting to execute the scheme by mailing his 
resume to VECO.”20 Weyhrauch never actually obtained any 
compensation or benefits from VECO.21 
The district court found that Weyhrauch was not required to 
disclose his conflict of interest under Alaska state law.22 The 
government argued at trial that evidence of Weyhrauch’s potential 
ethical violations should nonetheless be admitted because such 
evidence could be used to support an honest services fraud conviction 
under federal law.23 The district court ruled otherwise, holding that 
“any duty to disclose sufficient to support the mail and wire fraud 
charges here must be a duty imposed by state law.”24 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the first mail fraud statute to protect citizens 
from deprivation of tangible assets, such as money or property.25 
Later, Federal appeals courts interpreted the scope of the mail fraud 
 16. Joint Appendix at 14, Weyhrauch, No. 08-1196 (U.S. Sep. 14, 2009). 
 17. Richard Mauer, Supreme Court Sets Date for Weyhrauch Arguments, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2009, available at http://www.adn.com/news/politics/ 
fbi/weyhrauch/story/954429.html. 
 18. Joint Appendix, supra note 16, at 23. 
 19. Id. at 19. 
 20. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Weyhrauch’s 
indictment). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1240. 
 23. Id. 
 24. U.S. v Kott, 2007 WL 2572355, *6 (D. Alaska 2007). 
 25. Avery, supra note 1, at 1435 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870)). 
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statute to include deprivation of intangible rights, such as the right to 
honest services.26 The Supreme Court scaled this interpretation back 
considerably in McNally v. United States.27 In addressing the question 
of whether § 1341 criminalized the deprivation of the public of honest 
services, the Court held that the statute was limited to the protection 
of property rights.28 The Court noted nothing in the statute to indicate 
that Congress intended to diverge from the common understanding of 
the term when it enacted § 1341.29 The following year Congress 
enacted § 1346, effectively overruling McNally and extending the 
definition of fraud to include “a scheme or artifice to deprive another 
of the intangible right of honest services.”30 
Section 1346 has a rather sparse legislative history. The statute was 
passed as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.31 Representative 
John Conyers stated that the “amendment restores the mail fraud 
provision to where that provision was before the McNally decision. . . . 
This amendment is intended merely to overturn the McNally decision. 
No other change in the law is intended.”32 After the Bill’s passage, 
Senator Biden explained that the amendment was intended to 
“reinstate all of the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the mail and 
wire fraud statutes without change.”33 The clearest expression of 
Congress’s intent, therefore, was merely to overrule McNally and 
reinstate the pre-McNally line of cases. This effectively reestablished 
the pre-McNally precedent in the Supreme Court as well as in each of 
the circuit courts. The true meaning of § 1346, therefore, turns on 
whether the pre-McNally line of cases supported a federal common-
law definition of honest services. 
The circuit courts are split over the scope of the honest services 
doctrine.34 The Third Circuit has adopted a broad rule, requiring the 
government to prove that a public official violated a fiduciary duty 
 26. Id. See also United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he statute 
is ‘quite broad’ and ‘generally proscribes “any scheme or artifice to defraud” which in some way 
involves the use of the postal system.’”  (quoting United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 534 
(3d Cir. 1978))). 
 27. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 28. Id. at 360. 
 29. Id. at 351. 
 30. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2006). 
 31. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as 
18 U.S.C. § 1346). 
 32. 134 CONG. REC. H11108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
 33. 134 CONG. REC. S17360-02 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
 34. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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specifically established by state or federal law.35 The Fifth Circuit 
requires the government to prove an independent state law 
violation.36 None of the remaining circuits apply a state-law limiting 
principle, but they differ substantially in how a federal standard is to 
be applied.37 
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that explicitly employs the 
state-law limiting principle.38 Echoing the Supreme Court’s concerns 
in McNally, the Fifth Circuit was concerned that § 1346 would 
promote overreaching by federal prosecutors into state and local 
public ethics standards,39 thus posing a threat to federalism.40 The First 
Circuit has stood out as the most prominent critic of the state-law 
limiting principle,41 having repeatedly rejected it in its rulings.42 The 
First Circuit requires that an official’s misconduct involve more than a 
mere conflict of interest to support a conviction.43 The Tenth and 
Eighth Circuits have held that a public official’s breach of duty must 
be material and accompanied by fraudulent intent.44 The Seventh 
Circuit takes a unique approach and has enunciated what it labels the 
 35. United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 116–117 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 36. Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734–35 (“Stated directly, the official must act or fail to act 
contrary to the requirements of his job under state law.”) 
 37. See Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1244 (“The majority of circuits . . . have held that the 
meaning of ‘honest services’ is governed by a uniform federal standard inherent in § 1346, 
although they have not uniformly defined the contours of that standard.”). 
 38. See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734–35 (“Stated directly, the official must act or fail to act 
contrary to the requirements of his job under state law.”). 
 39. See id. at 734 (“We find nothing to suggest that Congress was attempting in § 1346 to 
garner to the federal government the right to impose upon states a federal vision of appropriate 
services—to establish, in other words, an ethical regime for state employees.”). 
 40. See id. (“Such a taking of power would sorely tax separation of powers and erode our 
federalist structure.”). 
 41. Avery, supra note 11, at 1439. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 726 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In general, proof of 
a state law violation is not required for conviction of honest services fraud.” (citing United 
States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987))); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 55 
(1st Cir. 1998) (noting that a public official’s “affirmative duty to disclose” may stem from 
general common law fiduciary duties); United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31, 41–42 (1st Cir. 
2001) (holding that the government need not show a state law violation to go forward in 
prosecuting the defendant for honest-services mail fraud). 
 43. See United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 298–99 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The issue could be 
pertinent here if the government in this case had chosen to proceed on the theory that a conflict 
of interest alone . . . was a basis for conviction.”). 
 44. Id. See also United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We agree 
with the Eighth Circuit, however, that § 1346 must be read against a backdrop of the mail and 
wire fraud statutes, thereby requiring fraudulent intent and a showing of materiality.”); United 
States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[P]rior intangible rights convictions involving 
private sector relationships have almost invariably included proof of actual harm to the victims’ 
tangible interests.”). 
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“misuse-of-position-for-private-gain limitation.”45 Under this 
limitation, to prove an honest-services mail fraud violation, the 
government must prove that a public official misused or intended to 
misuse her office for private gain by use of the mail.46 
IV. HOLDING 
While the Ninth Circuit ultimately declined to adopt the state-law 
limiting principle,47 it noted that the Brumley decision addressed all of 
the various federalist concerns by doing so.48 The Brumley holding 
sets clear boundaries for federal honest-services fraud liability by 
limiting its scope to preexisting state law, thus preventing federal 
overreaching into state affairs.49 The court also noted that a state-law 
limiting principle places redress for corruption in the hands the state 
and local political process rather than federal prosecution.50
The Ninth Circuit relied on the general proposition that the pre-
McNally line of cases generally did not require an independent state 
law duty of honest services.51 In forming its rule, the court attached 
this proposition to the rule of Badders v. United States,52 which 
identified Congress’s affirmative power to prevent the use of the mail 
in furtherance of fraudulent schemes, whether Congress has the 
power to prohibit the particular scheme in question or not.53 
Additionally, due to the interdependent relationship between state 
and federal policy, Congress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
state policymakers and regulators, in failing to perform their services 
honestly, do not frustrate the goals of federal policies.54 Such an 
interest may be protected by the federal fraud statutes.55 
 45. See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts have felt the 
need to find limiting principles, and ours has been that the ‘[m]isuse of office . . . for private gain 
is the line that separates run-of-the-mill violations of state-law fiduciary duty . . . from federal 
crime’.”) (citing United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
 46. See id. at 708 (“Showing misuse for private gain means showing an intent to reap 
private gain; it is well established that a fraudulent scheme that does not actually cause harm is 
still actionable.”). 
 47. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 48. Id. at 1244. 
 49. Id. at 1244–45. 
 50. See id. at 1245 (“[T]o the extent the honest services doctrine is intended to ensure 
public officials act ethically, elected state officials are accountable to their constituencies, who 
can punish dishonest or unethical conduct directly at the ballot box . . . .”). 
 51. Id. at 1246. 
 52. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1246. 
 55. Id. 
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In declining to adopt the state-law limiting principle, the circuit 
court cited United States v. Louderman,56 which held that state law 
plays no role in a court’s determination whether a federal fraud 
statute has been violated.57 The court found no indication that 
Congress meant to make the meaning of the term “honest services” 
dependent upon state law.58 Moreover, the court identified a 
potentially troubling inconsistency in conditioning the mail fraud 
statute on state-law violations: “conduct in one state might violate the 
mail fraud statute, whereas identical conduct in a neighboring state 
would not.”59 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit assessed the state-law limiting principle as 
applied by the Brumley court to § 1346 with substantial approval, yet 
the court ultimately rejected it on jurisprudential grounds.  
Determining that Ninth Circuit precedent did not support its 
adoption, the court instead adopted a uniform federal standard in its 
interpretation of § 1346. 
A.  The State-Law Limiting Principle 
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit court to embrace fully a state-
law limiting principle, and its holding in Brumley was cited with 
approval by the Ninth Circuit. Were the Supreme Court to adopt a 
state-law limiting principle, it would likely follow the model outline in 
Brumley. Because mail fraud has so frequently been used to 
prosecute state and local officials in corruption cases, the Court may 
prefer to adopt a model that respects more traditional principles of 
state sovereignty and federalism.60 Brumley rejected interpreting § 
1346 as a means by which the federal government could impose and 
enforce standards of good government upon the states.61 The decision 
was strongly federalist,62 as it would protect against the “danger to 
state sovereignty that results when the federal government is given 
 56. United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 57. Id. at 1387. 
 58. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1245–46. 
 59. Id. at 1246. 
 60. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 428–29 (1998) (discussing United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995)). 
 61. United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 62. See Coffee, supra note 60, at 448 (discussing Brumley’s holding and impact). 
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carte blanche to prosecute individuals for honest services mail and 
wire fraud in connection with state or local public officials.”63 
Adopting a federal common-law standard and allowing the 
federal government to determine both the meaning of “honest 
services” and prosecute individuals who do not provide such “honest 
services” may constitute overreaching into state affairs on the part of 
the federal government.64 Michael K. Avery has argued that although 
federal prosecution of public corruption is a necessity, at some point 
“pervasive federal authority threatens to trample the sovereignty 
afforded to the states by the federalist structure of the Constitution.”65 
Avery argued that the original rationale for federal prosecution for 
honest-services mail fraud in connection with state and local public 
corruption was simply the inability of the states to prosecute such 
matters themselves due to their limited judicial resources.66 So 
constructed, § 1346 is really intended to provide federal prosecutorial 
support for state and local ethics standards, rather than to import 
federal ethics standards into the state and local political processes.  In 
this way, the two bodies of law complement each other and the 
potential geographical inconsistency in enforcement identified by the 
Ninth Circuit may be less of a concern. 
B. The Uniform Federal Standard 
The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the state-law limiting 
principle, despite its approval of Brumley.67 In an attempt to deflect 
criticism, the court noted that “[a] federal action based on a valid 
constitutional grant of authority is not improper simply because it 
intrudes on state interests.”68 If the court was correct that § 1346 does 
not refer to state law,69 and that should § 1346 impose a general duty 
of honesty owed by public officials to their constituents, there would 
be no justification for imposing a state law limitation thereupon.70 The 
question then becomes one of Congressional intent.  It is possible that 
 63. Avery, supra note 1, at 1456. 
 64. Id. at 1455. 
 65. Avery, supra note 1, at 1457. 
 66. See id. at 1456–57 (“[T]he rationale for these prosecutions is that the states would 
prefer to prosecute these crimes, but due to their incapacity to do so, federal enforcement is 
necessary.”). 
 67. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 68. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ( “[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land.”). 
 69. Id. at 1245–46. 
 70. Id. 
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Congress has an interest in ensuring the honest behavior of state 
officials merely because state and federal policy affect one another, as 
the Ninth Circuit postulates.71 Section 1346 would then just be 
Congress’s attempt to put that interest into legal effect.  This, 
however, clearly implicates the federalist concerns raised by the Fifth 
Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in effect created a federal common-law 
crime of honest-services mail fraud that was independent of any state 
ethics laws. The Seventh Circuit called such a federal common-law 
crime “a beastie that many decisions say cannot exist.”72 At least one 
commentator argued that such a creation is entirely superfluous and 
that Congress likely meant to refer to state law governing public 
officials’ conduct when it referred to the right to honest services.73 The 
Supreme Court has thus far refused to recognize any federal criminal 
common law.74 In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., the court stated flatly, “there is no federal common 
law of crimes.”75 
The holding in Weyhrauch, however, has the advantage of 
uniformity. Had the Ninth Circuit adopted the state-law limiting 
principle, it would effectively sanction a state power to nullify a 
federal statute: were a state not to enact any laws protecting the 
public’s right to honest services from their elected representatives, § 
1346 would have no effect in that state. Moreover, corrupt public 
officials could evade federal prosecution by conducting illicit business 
out of state, resulting in a kind of corruption arbitrage. 
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
A. Arguments 
Weyhrauch argues that the Court should adopt a limiting principle 
similar to that in Brumley because § 1346 does not authorize the 
federal government to prosecute state officials for failing to disclose 
conflicts of interest that do not violate state law.  Primarily, 
 71. Id. at 1246. 
 72. United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 73. George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 
283 n.491 (1996). 
 74. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (noting that “we are not in the free-
wheeling days antedating Erie v. Tompkins”) (citation omitted). 
 75. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 
(1994). 
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Weyhrauch argues that the phrase “scheme or artifice to defraud” in § 
1346 evidences a legislative purpose to impose liability solely for 
violations of state disclosure laws.76 Because the crime punishes public 
officials who deprive the public of honest services, Weyhrauch 
contends that “[c]ommon sense would dictate that absent a clear, 
affirmative duty . . .  to disclose particular information” must exist 
before a local public official can be charged with a federal crime.77 
Weyhrauch also argues that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 
1346 violates three canons of statutory construction: the clear 
statement rule, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and the rule 
of lenity.78 Under the clear statement rule, where an interpretation of 
a federal statute would upset the balance between federal and state 
power, the Court requires “unmistakably clear” statutory language 
before it will adopt such an interpretation.79  Weyhrauch argues that 
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1346 requires  federal courts to 
create new federal common law “from scratch,” and that such a 
reading is unsustainable due to a lack of unmistakably clear statutory 
language authorizing such a mandate.80  Weyhrauch also argues that 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance compels a rejection of the 
Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 1346, because such a reading might render 
the statute void for vagueness.81  A statute may be held to be void for 
vagueness if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or 
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”82  Weyhrauch 
argues that the disclosure obligations imposed by the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding would not provide a person of ordinary intelligence with fair 
notice because “it does not say what ‘honest services’ may be, or when 
they are withheld deceitfully.”83 
The United States supports the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 1346, 
contending that prosecution under § 1346 does not require an 
 76. See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Weyhrauch v. United States,  No. 08-1196 (Sep. 14, 2009) 
(“Where Alaska itself has enacted detailed provisions on the ethical and disclosure duties of its 
officials, the violation of some as yet unidentified and broader federal common law duty can 
hardly be deemed fraudulent.”). 
 77. Id. at 16. 
 78. Weyhrauch’s rule of lenity argument is brief and supplemental and shall not be 
discussed in this commentary. 
 79. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76, at 17. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 19. 
 82. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008)). 
 83. Id. 
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independent state law violation.84  The United States advances two 
principal arguments: that the specific language of § 1346 was 
deliberately chosen by Congress to reject the need for an independent 
state law violation,85 and that the pre-McNally line of cases § 1346 
reinstated held that honest-services mail fraud does not require a 
violation of state law.86 
The United States argues that Congress employed the phrase “the 
intangible right of honest services” as a term of art, intending to 
invoke the pre-McNally definition of honest-services mail fraud, 
which, the Government contends, does not require a state law 
violation.87  Citing McDermott International v. Wilander,88 the 
Government notes that where Congress directly overturns a decision 
of the Supreme Court and in doing so makes use of a specific term 
from that decision, that term is deemed to have its established 
meaning.89 Here, since the phrase “the intangible right of honest 
services,” as used in the pre-McNally line of cases, did not require an 
independent state honest services law, that same phrase as used in § 
1346 would similarly lack such a requirement. 
Before McNally, the courts considered a failure to disclose a 
conflict of interest concerning official action to be honest services 
fraud.90 Because § 1346 reinstates that line of cases, the United States 
contends that § 1346 also reinstates the general theory of liability for 
honest services fraud that existed before McNally.91 The brief for the 
United States also contains a detailed and informative review of the 
statute’s legislative history, noting that the original draft of what 
would eventually become § 1346 did contain references to state law as 
requirements for prosecution under additional provisions.92  These 
references, however, were not incorporated into the final honest-
 84. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 11. 
 85. See id. at 12 (“When Congress enacted Section 1346, it employed language derived 
directly from McNally and the line of authority that McNally rejected.”). 
 86. Id. at 15. 
 87. Id. at 12. 
 88. McDermott Int’l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991). 
 89. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 16. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 19 (“[A]n individual ‘who fails to disclose material information’ can commit 
fraud through his silence if he has ‘a duty to [disclose]’ that information.” (quoting Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980))). 
 92. The Department of Justice, which had drafted the proposal, initially included 
additional provisions which would have allowed for longer sentences for violations of state 
honest-services laws as well as for schemes specifically targeted to disrupt the election process 
through means violative of state law. Brief for Respondent supra note 15, at 22–23. 
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services provision.93  Additionally, representative Conyers, who 
presided at the hearing at which the Department of Justice proposed 
its version of § 1346, stated that the statute would reestablish that an 
honest-services scheme to defraud was not dependent upon a state-
law violation.94 
While Weyhrauch’s arguments are sensible and even somewhat 
persuasive, they are contradicted by the legislative history of § 1346.  
Weyhrauch neatly identifies many of the difficulties which the Ninth 
and Fifth Circuits sought to resolve, like the potential inter-state 
irregularity in enforcement as well as the potential for vagueness.  
However, the United States hews more closely to the actual statutory 
language and makes effective use of the statute’s legislative history. 
Because § 1346 was expressly enacted to reinstate the pre-McNally 
line of cases, a body of law which uniformly rejected the need for an 
independent state law violation for honest-services fraud prosecution, 
the statute’s purpose should be clear. Additionally, the fact that 
references to state law were deleted from the statute is strong 
evidence that Congress intended the statute to operate independent 
of state law; this is strong support that Congress identified a federal 
interest in all public officials, state or otherwise, performing their 
duties honestly. 
B. Disposition 
While the United States’ arguments are authoritative, 
Weyhrauch’s argument is strongly in line with the Fifth Circuit’s 
Brumley decision. Thus, while legal precedent and the current trend 
amongst the circuit courts toward a federal common-law standard 
would drive the Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the 
concerns identified by Weyhrauch and the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
cannot and should not be ignored. Thus, the Court is not likely to 
affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Instead, it will probably adopt a 
principle that limits honest services mail fraud in some substantial 
way, potentially incorporating the need for an independent state law 
violation in the model of Brumley. The Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to create new federal common law.95 Justice Scalia already 
 93. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 22 (“[T]he text defining those offenses did 
not refer to state law, and the Department [of Justice] made clear that ‘proof of the elements of 
a State offense would not be required’.”). 
 94. Id. at 23 (quoting United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir. 1979)). 
 95. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 17 (listing instances in which the 
Supreme Court has declined to create new federal common law). See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 
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signaled his support for limiting the scope of the honest-services 
doctrine, possibly to the extent of a state-law limiting principle.96 
The Court will probably seek to resolve the federalist concerns of 
the Fifth Circuit, especially given the strong support of the Brumley 
decision offered by the Ninth Circuit.97 It is possible that the Ninth 
Circuit, by citing the Brumley decision with such approval yet 
declining to adopt the state-law limiting principle for precedential 
reasons, was signaling to the Supreme Court that it would prefer to 
incorporate the Brumley rule had it the power to do so. Additionally, 
the facts of Weyhrauch provide grounds for the Court to limit the 
scope of § 1346, as Alaska state law does not mandate disclosure of 
conflicts of interest. This case forces the Court to grapple with the 
problem Justice Scalia recently identified: “Is it the role of the Federal 
Government to define the fiduciary duties that a town alderman or 
school board trustee owes to his constituents?”98 The federal 
government has prosecuted Bruce Weyhrauch for acts that, while 
unethical, are not illegal under Alaska state law.  In fact, as 
Weyhrauch’s brief contends, the Alaska legislature is not expected to 
be a professional legislature, having only a 120-day session per year so 
that state officials may seek other employment during the remainder 
of the year.99 The possibility that an Alaska legislator would seek 
employment while serving is less outlandish than it might be in a state 
with a more professional legislature.  The imposition of a new federal 
common law crime of honest services fraud might simply impose a 
duty on the legislators of Alaska that its citizens may simply not want. 
 
373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (signaling the court’s reluctance to create federal common law); United 
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997) (“Federal crimes are defined by Congress, not the 
courts.”) (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988))). 
 96. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“It is one thing to enact and enforce clear rules against certain types of corrupt 
behavior . . . but quite another to mandate a freestanding, open-ended duty to provide ‘honest 
services’—with the details to be worked out case-by-case.”). 
 97. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Fifth 
Circuit’s state law limiting principle, which the district court adopted, addresses all of these 
[federalist] concerns.”). 
 98. Sorich, 129 S. Ct. at 1310 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76, at 18. 
